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Globalism has become an emblem for a whole series of dramatic changes in the international
economy.  The hyperbole in the media and popular novels that suggests a whirling era of giant
companies, shifting money, and hapless governments, often hides the distinctive features of
changing markets.  This paper proposes that recent changes in the organization of production and
product development are altering the terms of competition in many world markets and creating
significant global opportunities for Danish firms.  Those opportunities promise to enhance the
development of Danish industry and employment.  But there are risks.  The new opportunities lie
both in the new terms of competition that are observed in altered processes of product and
component development and in the cross-national production networks that permit small
companies to seize these opportunities.  We label as “Wintelism” the new terms of competition
and the new competitive strategies; we call the new organization of production Cross-national
Production Networks (CNPNs).  New risks lie in the accelerated pace of product and process
development that make it harder and more essential to correctly judge technical developments,
competitor strategies, and customer possibilities.  The Danish policy question is whether the set
of institutions and arrangements that constitute its industrial “market  and policy logic”—or to use
a different vocabulary, its National System of Innovation—is able to support the pursuit of the
opportunities that “Wintelism” and Cross National Production Networks (CNPNs) create.
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7Preface
We are quite happy to integrate international scholars in the DRUID network and to publish their
work in the DRUID working paper series. Even more so when as in this case their contribution
forms an input to a project connected to DRUID.
In the application for the Disko-project (The Danish Innovation System in a Comparative
perspective - which is a (3-year project financed by the Danish Council for Industrial
Development) we pointed to the process of globalisation as one of the major new trends which
create new conditions for Danish firms. In this context we have been able to establish a
collaboration with leading experts on international business and attached them as visiting scholars.
John Zysman normally attached to BRIE at Berkeley has been a visiting scholar at Aalborg
University in the fall 1996 and during this period he produced this paper on global industrial
networks.
The paper presents major changes in the pattern of global competition and how different major
players have been able to position themselves in this new game. The new 'Wintelist' mode of
competition is one where the most rapidly growing firms are those which are in control of
development capabilities in relation to core components characterised by accelerating innovation
and difficulties to imitate. Of special interest are the considerations regarding implications for
Danish firms. Zysman and Borrus argue that there are promising windows of opportunity.
However, in order to exploit them there is a need for new strategies emphasising niches, turnkey
product systems and transnational networking.
It has been agreed that the paper simultaneously is published in the BRIE Working Paper Series.
Bengt-Åke Lundvall
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9This is presented by Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson in several places: Globalization in Question (London1
and New York: Polity Press and Blackwell, 1996); “Globalization and the Future of the Nation State,” Economy
and Society
 24, no.3 (August 1995); “The Problem of Globalization,” Economy and Society 21, no.4 (November
1992). Of course, as Raymond Vernon remarked at the BRIE Working Meeting on Globalization, March 8, 1996,
the character, pattern and significance of the international ties pre-1914 were vastly different than those developed
today—much more the result of European Colonial rule and preferences. 
This is drawn from Borrus, Cohen, and Zysman, Globalization and Production. BRIE Working Paper #452
(Berkeley: BRIE, 1991). See also, Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment
 (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
This material is drawn from a forthcoming article by Borrus and Zysman, and from Borrus et al., Globalization3
and Production.
A Competition of Strategies
The international economy has changed, there is no doubt. The fact of expanding market ties is
not itself in question; at issue is the character of those ties, the pattern they form, and their
significance. While the intensity of interconnection—the volumes of trade and investment as a
percentage of GDP—has grown dramatically since World War II, we are only now returning to
the “intensities” of 1914 which were disrupted by two World Wars and a trade-shrinking Great
Depression.  Nonetheless, 1996 is, quite evidently, a very different era than 1914. The character1
of the economic connections among countries and firms in 1914 and 1996 are quite different as
well. 
What distinguishes the present era that has been code-named “Global” from earlier eras that were
code-named “International” and “Multinational”?  When international firms first sold abroad, their2
era, the period of British industrial pre-eminence, was one of trade. Multinational firms produced
abroad in a variety of locations, defining an American era led by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
In each case, the British international era and the American multinational era, a single dominant
style of production organization spread out from a single dominant core country. Firms in other
countries imitated, adapted, or struggled to cope with the advances of their competitors in the lead
country.
The present “global” era, to use that often deceptive label, has a distinct logic and feel.  This is a3
world economy of multiple centers, each with a distinct capacity for innovation and development.
As a consequence, in contrast to its predecessors, this era lacks a dominant style. It is distinctively
diverse and uncertain. It is not just that the terms of corporate competition have been altered.
Rather, a multiplicity of corporate and national strategies compete to capture advantage in volatile
markets. Speed product differentiation, networking, and an emphasis on intellectual property all
join the necessities of price and quality to mark the new phase of competition.
This ‘Global’ era’s variety is deeply rooted. Innovation and competition come not just from varied
corporate strategies, but from multiple geographic directions. There are new competitors, and the
10
T.J. Pempel “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic Bases for International Behavior” in Katzenstein,4
ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). John Zysman and Laura Tyson,
“The Politics of Productivity: Developmental Strategy and Production Innovation in Japan” Politics and
Productivity: The Real Story of How Japan Works,
 Ed. Chalmers Johnson, Laura Tyson, and John Zysman,
Ballinger, 1989.
See Borrus and Zysman, Lines of Fracture, Webs of Cohesion: Economic Interconnection and Security Politics5
in Asia BRIE Working Paper #71 (Berkeley: BRIE, 1994); Zysman, Doherty, and Schwartz, Tales of the Global
Economy: Cross-National Production Networks and the Reorganization of the European Economy”, Structural
Change and Economic Dynamics. (North Holland, 1996); for elaboration, see Zysman and Steve Weber, “Why
the Changed Relation Between Security and Economy Will Alter the Character of the European Union”
forthcoming, 1997.
position of established players has been reshuffled. From that vantage, the global era began when,
driven by extraordinarily rapid domestic growth that induced the building of excess capacity,
Japanese firms made dramatic competitive entries into a long list of sectors in Western markets,
principally American.  Globalism, seen in this fashion, is the arrival of the Asian4
challenge—Japan’s success followed by the extraordinary rates of Asian growth in the second
development tier (especially Korea and Taiwan), the third development tier (Thailand and
Malaysia among others), and now parts of China. Asia’s growth has been premised on a distinctive
asymmetry in trade and investment, a seemingly permanent trade surplus with the West. This era
is, thus, one in which an increasingly global market coexists with enduring national foundations
of distinctive economic growth trajectories and corporate strategies. Globalization has not led to
the elimination of national systems of production. National systems endure; but they are evolving
together in a world economy that increasingly has a regional structure. Three regional groupings
have emerged: North America, Europe, and Asia (consisting principally of Japan, Taiwan, Korea,
Southeast Asia, and parts of China)—the countries that provide the principle nodes of the cross-
national production networks that concern us here. Together the three regional groups constitute
about 75% of the world economy. Increasingly, the internal “architecture” of each region – defined
by its political/security arrangements and economic institutions – shapes distinctive regional
market dynamics that influence national options and corporate strategies.  With the reintegration5
of Central and Eastern Europe, the European economy suddenly has become much more diverse
and varied, opening the possibility for production reorganization that is likely to benefit those
countries, such as Denmark, with the greatest industrial skill at product development and market
definition.
In sum this “global” era is characterized by:
• Expanding cross-national market interconnections (trade, financial flows, etc.)
• A multiplicity of distinctive corporate and national competitive strategies
• Enduring national foundations for those strategies which result in distinctive growth
trajectories
• A regional economic architecture.
11
By vertical control we mean both vertical integration from inputs through assembly to distribution as in the case6
of American auto producers, and the ‘virtual’ integration of Asian enterprise group as when Japanese producers
of consumer durables effectively dominate market relations with semi-independent suppliers through the Keiretsu
group structure. See Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes : A Survey and Research
Agenda
 (Stanford, CA : Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, 1993). The Japanese Firm:
the Sources of Competitive Strength
 edited by Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994); Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Michael L. Gerlach Alliance capitalism : the social organization of
Japanese business
 (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1992).
The “global” economy is, as a consequence, a complex and often contradictory story of global
markets, national development strategies, regional dynamics, and competing corporate strategies.
Maybe You Don’t Have to Be A Giant
Two interconnected elements of this story of the “global” economy concern us: the emergence of
both “Wintelism” and Cross-national Production Networks (CNPNs). “Wintelism” is the code
word we use to reflect the shift in competition away from final assembly and vertical control of
markets by final assemblers.  Competition in the “Wintelist” era, by contrast, is a struggle over6
setting and evolving de facto product-market standards, with market power lodged anywhere in
the value-chain including product architectures, components and software. Each point in the value
chain can involve significant competitions among independent producers of the constituent
elements of the system (e.g., components, subsystems)—not just among assemblers—for control
over the evolution of technology and final markets. CNPN is a label we apply to the consequent
dis-integration of the industry’s value-chain into constituent functions that can be contracted-out
to independent producers wherever those companies are located in the global economy. This
strategic and organizational innovation, at an extreme, can convert production of even complex
products into a commodity that can be purchased in the market. Together, Wintelism and CNPNs
have already altered the terms of competition in electronics and promise to change the way a
broader range of sectors operate. Although these elements are first evident in electronics, the
electronics case suggests developments of general importance. One particular consequence is that
together these developments promise to alter the kinds of product-markets and competitive
strategies that can be pursued by small- and middle-sized firms and thus their place in world
markets. 
We develop our story in the following five steps:
• The emergence of “Wintelism”;
• Cross-national Production Networks (CNPNs) and contract production; 
• How Wintelism and CNPNs together have altered competition in electronics;
• Why the developments may be significant in a range of sectors beyond electronics;
12
• The implications for Denmark and Danish firms;
13
After initial remarks below on the auto industry, the discussion of the evolution of competition in electronics and7
the emergence of Wintelism which follows is drawn from Michael Borrus, Left for Dead: Wintelism, Asian
Production Networks and the Revival of US Electronics
 (tentative title), manuscript in progress, forthcoming,
1997. 
James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine That Changed The World (New York:8
HarperPerennial, 1991); Also Alan Altshuler, Martin Anderson, Daniel Jones, Daniel Roos and James Womack,
The Future of the Automobile (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).
Womack et al.9
I. THE EMERGENCE of WINTELISM: 
From Assembly to Standards, Components, Subsystems and Architectures7
Let us look again at the diversity of strategies and the competition among them. In the auto
industry, competition remains centrally a battle among the assemblers such as Toyota, GM, and
Renault who design and integrate the final product. That competition has been dominated by
production innovation and marketing. Early on, a high-volume mass production strategy, often
labeled Fordist, became the emblem of modern times. Its production principles became a model
for all competitors in the industry to emulate. Thus, pioneering American firms entered the
European market and established enduring positions on the basis of innovations in mass
production. There were significant European product innovations in response, but the European
market consisted of stable oligopolies or national monopolies, with competition largely revolving
around marginal product developments and marketing.8
By the mid-1970s, however, another fundamental innovation in production, labeled flexible volume
production, or “lean” production, provided Japanese firms the capacity to enter and alter markets
in North America and later Europe. Lean production enabled Japanese firms to compete on the
basis of newer price-performance packages and shorter product cycles than traditional mass
production techniques could deliver. In effect, firms like Toyota established new market entry
points and rapidly expanded them into significant product segments via the advantages that their
distinctive production organization permitted.  Again there was competitive response, this time9
by European and American firms. In particular, European luxury car producers like Mercedes and
BMW innovated in products, while American and European mass producers closed the production
cost/quality gap through selective adoption of “lean” techniques. And after their formidable initial
success, some Japanese producers like Honda proved to be less adept at product development than
production, and all recently have faced higher costs resulting primarily from the increased value
of the yen. 
In their turn, then, each set of production innovations, first those at Ford and then those at Toyota,
altered conceptions of best practice in organization, technology, and management. Ford's
innovation was the implementation of mass production; Toyota's innovation was a reorganization
of mass production to create flexibility with volume. Both innovations created decisive market
14
For the classic account of competition in this era, see John Tilton International Diffusion of Technology; The10
Case of Semiconductors
 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971).
advantage. Perhaps more significant, both influenced production strategies and organization in a
broad range of other industries, especially consumer durables. More broadly, each deeply
influenced general thinking about market competition and shaped the character of advanced
industrial society.
In the new era, we believe that the electronics and information technology industries are beginning
to play a similarly influential role. In electronics over the last decade, by contrast to the auto
industry, the terms of competition have shifted away from final assemblers and the strategy of
hierarchical (i.e., vertical) control of technologies and manufacturing. The character of the shift
in market power is popularly suggested in the advertisements of PC producers like IBM, Toshiba,
Compaq or Siemens-Nixdorf whose systems are nearly identical and who emphasize components
or software that have become de-facto market standards—"Intel Inside," or “Microsoft Windows
installed”—rather than unique features of their own brands. In our view, "Wintelism" is the code
word that best captures the character of the new global electronics era because Intel and Microsoft
pioneered many of its dominant industrial and business practices and are now leveraging their
control over PCs to alter the terms of competition in other informatics markets. 
The pre-Wintel electronics industry was dominated by assemblers, i.e., systems producers who
designed, marketed, and assembled, the final product with a structure and strategy similar to the
auto industry. Early post-war American producers like GE, RCA and IBM prospered with quite
traditional advantages of scale, vertical integration and, for some products, mass production.
Starting in the 1960s, American semiconductor and consumer electronics firms created off-shore
assembly platforms in Asia to reduce labor costs in their domestic competition.  But in that10
competitive phase, the competition, critical market, and product development, were all principally
American. Limited off-shore assembly was really a conservative attempt by American firms to
preserve with cheap foreign labor an existing production system. That attempt, of course, failed.
On a similar model of vertical control, IBM dominated the computer segment of the electronics
industry and extended its franchise into Europe and Asia in pursuit of new markets. Similar
strategies produced dominant players like Western Electric and Siemens in the telecommunications
segment of the market.
Also starting in the 1960s, in the course of attempting to emulate IBM in structure and strategy,
Japanese producers like Matsushita and Hitachi began to overturn established American positions
in the consumer electronics market. Much as Toyota and other Japanese auto companies, they did
so by applying the lean production principles in order to innovate in traditional consumer
electronics products with all solid-state televisions. As in autos, adoption of lean production
techniques enabled Japanese electronics firms to create new and distinctive market segments by
15
the late 1970s with the Walkman, VCR, and Camcorder, and by the early 1980s, to challenge US
leadership in semiconductors. Here too, however, the dominant market position still lay with the
final product assemblers who controlled consumer product definition, and usually both the supply
and distribution chains. Their competitive strength was the ability to manufacture high quality at
consumer price points with some degree of product variety.
By the early 1980s, essentially all electronics product-markets were dominated by large-scale
producers such as IBM, Siemens, Matsushita, NEC, and Toshiba. They produced fully proprietary
systems whose key product standards—i.e., the technical specifications that describe the system
architecture and enable the pieces of the system to inter-operate as a whole and with each
other—were either fully “closed” or fully “open.” A fully open standard is one in which the
technical information necessary to implement the standard is in the public domain—i.e., fully
available on a nondiscriminatory and timely basis to anyone. This was the case with most
consumer and many communications interface standards like TV or fax broadcast standards. With
the relevant technical information in the public domain, products like TVs and radios built to such
open standards became commodities in which scale, quality, and cost, were the defining features
of competition in highly contested markets.
By contrast, telecommunications and computer firms built to “closed” standards in which the
relevant technical information was owned as intellectual property and NOT made available to
anyone other than through legally permissible reverse engineering. IBM’s mainframe computers
epitomized such proprietary, closed systems. Here, too, vertical control over technologies and
manufacturing was essential especially in the early stages of competition when new systems were
introduced. But once established in the market, competition centered on growing an installed base
of customers who could be locked-in to a firm’s product line. Lock-in was possible
because—unlike in the open standards case where all products were built to implement the same
standard so that users could seamlessly switch between them—the costs of switching between
closed systems could be very high indeed (requiring, for example, rewriting an existing base of
software and retraining all users). Large installed bases were essentially decisive over time in these
competitions—as all of IBM’s competitors discovered—because those who had them would
almost always have lower per-unit costs for succeeding generations than the competition since
such costs (e.g., of development or marketing) could be amortized over more locked-in users. In
sum, then, with both closed and open systems, vertical control over technologies and
manufacturing was the key to market success—in order to capture closed system rents and lock-in
customers to proprietary standards or to compete on implementation, quality and price in
markets for the system that implemented open standards.
 
This era of proprietary systems built to open or closed standards lasted until the early 1980s.
Throughout it there were shifts in market structure, attacks on established incumbents, a myriad
16
For an elaboration, see Borrus and Zysman, ‘Wintelism’ and the Changing Frameworks of Global Competition:11
Prototype of the Industrial Future?
 BRIE Working Paper, forthcoming 1997.
The ‘open-but-owned’ rubric was first suggested in conversations with Robert Spinrad, Vice President of12
Technology Analysis and Development at Xerox. 
of new entrants, and not least, significant policy interventions that helped (e.g., through protection,
antitrust, or procurement) to shape market outcomes. And some of those changes, like the
emergence of merchant component suppliers, began subtly to undermine the logic of competition
rooted in scale and vertical control of technology and created the evolutionary ground for the
emergence of Wintelism. We don’t review that evolution here.  Suffice it to say that in the11
struggle to break loose from IBM’s dominance and to react to the Japanese ascent, new strategies
emerged within the logic and possibilities of digital microelectronics-based systems. The
pioneering product was of course, the PC. But the extraordinary pace of technical progress and
ever-improving price/performance soon made the underlying microelectronics technologies
increasingly pervasive, transforming just about everything from telecommunications switches
through automobiles and hearing aids. By the mid 1980s, new electronics product-markets began
to converge on a cost-effective, common technological foundation of networkable,
microprocessor-based systems (of which the PC is emblematic). 
Such systems enabled a dramatic shift in the character of electronics products—from the prior
era’s proprietary systems built to fully open or closed standards, to the Wintelist era’s ‘open-but-
owned’ systems built to ‘restricted’ standards. In the new systems, key product standards,
especially the interface specifications which permit interoperability with the operating system or
system hardware, are owned as intellectual property but made available to others who produce
complementary or competing components, systems, or software products. Hence the systems are
‘open-but-owned’.  The relevant technical standards are licensed rather than published, with12
either the universe of licensees, the degree of documentation of the technical specifications, or the
permissible uses, ‘restricted’ in some fashion. Very often, changes can be made unilaterally by the
standard holder in ways that affect availability and timing of access to the interface
specification—as Microsoft is routinely accused of doing by its licensee-competitors. In essence,
open-but-owned systems combined competitive elements from both product types of the prior
era—the standards are licensed in order to create commodity-like competition around system
elements chosen by the licenser (e.g., around assembled PCs built to Intel processor architecture
standards), while remaining restricted in order to build installed-base and lock-in customers.
The shift to the new systems was accelerated by two factors. One was the increasing cost and
complexity of continuing innovation, which made it increasingly difficult for any one company,
even IBM, to maintain ownership and control over all of the relevant technologies. The other shift
was toward increasingly strident demands from major industrial users as they moved their business
operations onto information networks, for increasing interoperability of complex systems
17
See François Bar and Michael Borrus, Information Networks and Competitive Advantage: Issues for Government13
Policy and Corporate Strategy Development, Final Report for the OECD, September 1989.
There are numerous accounts of this period. Representative are James Chopsky and Ted Leonsis, Blue Magic:14
The People, Power and Politics Behind the IBM Personal Computer
 (New York: Facts on File, 1988) and
Robert Cringely, Accidental Empires: How the boys of Silicon Valley make their millions, battle foreign
competition, and still can't get a date
 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992). 
purchased from multiple vendors.  But the move to such systems was pioneered, as perhaps it13
only could have been, by IBM with the IBM PC.  In order to get to market fast and exploit a14
market window opened by Apple (who had adopted a quite traditional proprietary systems
strategy), IBM pieced together the first open-but-owned PC using its own proprietary BIOS (basic
input-output system), and a variety of components and software from numerous third-party
vendors. It invited cloning to establish the market. Once firmly entrenched, IBM intended to bring
the product back in-house and make it increasingly proprietary. It presumed that a traditional
strategy of unsurpassed scale and vertical control of technology and manufacturing would fend
off the clones. It was wrong. Unfortunately for the computer giant, it permitted key standards in
its PC to be owned by others (especially Intel for the microprocessor architecture, and Microsoft
for the operating system) who innovated at the furious pace that focus and specialization
permitted. Gradually, they took control of the evolution of the PC’s key standards. In concert with
the clone-makers, Intel and Microsoft wrested control of the PC itself from IBM. Strategies to set
and control the evolution of de facto standards were developed. Business speed (e.g., rapid
product cycles, fast time to market) was rewarded. Wintelism was born. 
In this new epoch, firms located anywhere in the value chain can, potentially, control the evolution
of key standards and in that way define the terms of competition not just in their particular
segment but, critically, in the final product markets as well. Market power has shifted from the
assemblers such as Compaq , Gateway, IBM, or Toshiba, to, among others, key producers of
components (e.g., Intel), operating systems (e.g., Microsoft), applications (e.g., SAP, Adobe),
interfaces (e.g., Netscape), languages (Sun with Java) and to pure product definition companies
like Cisco Systems and 3COM. What all of these firms have in common is that, from quite
different vantage points in the informatics value chain, they all own key technical specifications
that have been accepted as de-facto product standards in the market. Each beat-out rival
standards. In winning, each created a universe of licensees who produce to the standard and add
value to its use—just as applications software firms like WordPerfect, PC assemblers like Compaq,
peripherals producers like Canon, or content providers like Grolliers, all produce to Microsoft’s
Windows operating system standards. Each standard owner maintains a growing installed base of
customers who use the products that conform to the standards. Each has been careful to evolve
the standards by adding incremental improvements in performance, functionality, features, quality,
or costs, within product generations, and dramatic improvements between generations (while
remaining backwardly compatible with past versions). In that way, each has effectively ‘locked-in’
their customer base in the sense explored earlier—that, given the customer’s investment in all of
18
For a more detailed and technical discussion of all of the aspects of standards competitions outlined above, see15
Francois Bar, Michael Borrus, and Richard Steinberg, Islands in the Bit Stream: Charting the NII
Interoperability Debate, BRIE Working Paper # 79 (Berkeley: BRIE, 1995) at section 2, and the myriad sources
on the economics of standardization cited there.
The shifting character of competition is not simply a matter of the emergence of software, of the Virtual16
Corporation, or the reorganization of production labeled post-Fordist manufacturing. Flexibility based on digital
codes in an era of "virtual" private information/telecom networks has a different meaning than that flexibility
rooted in general purpose machine tools. Problems of scale in software-rooted competition are completely
different in character and kind from that in the complex assembly of consumer durables with machine tool makers
struggling between flexibility and the low cost of long production runs.
the conforming products and in how to use them effectively, she will normally be unwilling to
switch to competing standards unless they offer truly radical and compensatory improvements in
price-performance-functionality. Switching will not occur, that is, unless it is even more costly to
stay put.15
Such Wintelist strategies effectively attenuate the link between market power and the ownership
of the assets of production that characterized the prior era of competition, and at the extremes as
with a firm like Cisco Systems, can completely decouple control of final markets from ownership
of manufacturing assets. For Wintelist firms, ownership and manipulation of their de facto
standards are barriers to entry considerably more effective than the barriers of scale and vertical
control over technology and production in the prior era because they are far harder to duplicate.
But production and scale do not vanish from the story; they are still significant Indeed, relevant
production know-how still facilitates continuing product and process development in most
industry segments. And, in many cases, traditional assemblers can use their additional advantages
of scale and vertical control to decisive advantage in playing the Wintelist game. For example,
Hewlett-Packard has been perhaps the most successful traditional systems assembler to adjust to
the Wintelist era. In PC printers, HP ‘drivers’ are the laser and inkjet operating system standards
(and printers are consequently the chief source of HP’s profits). In Unix workstations, HP’s open-
but-owned Precision Architecture has been one of the three principle contenders for market
leadership (with SUN and IBM). Even, as in PCs, where it does not own the relevant standards,
HP has successfully adjusted its business model to emphasize speed and continuous innovation
over manufacturing scale and vertical control.
In sum, this era in which electronics is now the driving and expanding industry group, the
electronics industry itself has entered a new era which we call “Wintelism”. In this "Wintelist" era,
competition has moved away from assembly to the rapid evolution of the constituent elements of
the system being assembled, that is, to the system architecture, its components and subsystems,
its operating system, languages and applications—and to the creation and evolution of restricted
de facto market standards in all of those areas.  Simultaneously, systems products have moved16
away from stand-alone proprietary systems toward open-but-owned systems that are meant to be
interconnected into digital information networks. In practice, the core functionality of final
19
Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post Industrial Economy (New17
York: Basic Books, 1987).
systems—and even of the networks they comprise—is often owned and controlled by the
independent companies who supply or define the constituent elements. They, rather than the final
assemblers, often control both the pace of technical advance and the availability of critical system
elements. As a consequence, product rents accrue to them rather than to assemblers. The creative
use of intellectual property rights and associated licensing strategies define defensible market
position more than manufacturing scale as the basis of competitive advantage. In this era, even
competition at the assembler level over system platforms is as much about standards as it is about
production: The desire of Sun to widely license its Java language to other assemblers, or of Oracle
to define and widely disseminate the architecture for a ‘network computer’ (NC) tailored for
Internet functionality, really represent their efforts to supplant the market dominance of standards
and architectures controlled by Microsoft and Intel. 
In this Wintelist era, manufacturing and production do not vanish in significance; rather they shift
location in the story. It remains true that you can not control what you can not produce.  But the17
ways of implementing and controlling production have changed. As we argue next, Wintelism has
an organizational counterpart, a distinctive system of production which we call the international
production network, or Cross-national Production Network.
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II. The Counterpart to “Wintelism”:
Cross-national Production Networks and The Manufacturing Services to
Construct Them
We are arguing that the strategic importance and hence the organization of production has
changed as competition and value-added have moved away from assembly. The defining
competition has been the rapid evolution of the constituent elements of the system being assembled
and to the creation and evolution of de facto market standards in all of those areas. Cross-national
production networks (CNPNs) and contract production services are the organizational
counterparts of that shift. CNPNs comprise a clever division of labor in which different value-chain
functions are carried on across national boundaries by different firms under the coordination either
of a lead MNC for its own production or of a Production Service Company (PSC) who manages
the production value chain for clients. As important, CNPNs express the reduced need for
companies to control production through ownership or direct management of each piece of the
value-chain. To be more specific, by a firm’s cross-national production network we mean: 
the organization, across national borders, of the relationships (intra and increasingly inter-firm)
through which the firm conducts research and development, product definition and design,
procurement, manufacturing, distribution, and support services. As a first approximation, such
networks comprise a lead firm, its subsidiaries and affiliates, its subcontractors and suppliers, its
distribution channels and sources of value-added product or service features, its joint ventures,
R&D alliances and other cooperative arrangements (like standards consortia). In contrast to
traditional forms of corporate organization, such networks boost a proliferation of non-equity,
non-arms-length, cross-border, inter-firm relationships in which significant value is added outside
the lead firm and entire business functions may be outsourced.  18
More is at issue than simply lower labor costs that permit particular components to be built or
assembly processes to be conducted at off-shore production locations.  Rather, intra-sectoral trade
and investment link together diverse production functions across national borders to create
complementary production arrangements which individual producers and nations would be
incapable of maintaining independently. A firm might use specialist producers of computer displays
in Japan, printed circuit boards assembled in China, disk drives from Malaysia, digital design and
final assembly services in Taiwan, software from Bangelore, and process development in
Singapore to create a PC. While these networks have some characteristics of earlier arrangements,
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For an extensive discussion of this point and elaboration of such networked production structures, see Michael20
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Such firm relationships to create a more intricate division of labor seem to take two forms. One division of labor21
will aim at creating economies of scale, hence grouping particular component or assembly activities of a similar
character that are presently below optimal size. That first division of labor may result from the integration of a
set of relatively homogeneous economies. When a region such as Europe began to generate a single market or
when the United States and Canada reduced auto barriers, firms sought to capture newly possible economies of
scale. What concerns us here is the second set of networks that emerge from linking diverse production locations.
the industrialists creating them believe they are doing something new and innovative precisely
because they are using a new kind of production system in a new kind of competition.  19
These networks have evolved to exploit an ever more intricate division of labor based on
increasing local technical specialization in Asia.  They are not principally about lower wages20
or access to markets and natural resources.  They are, however, about the linkages among diverse21
and heterogeneous economies. The East Asian story is one in which the regional—that is, cross-
national— dynamic
 of economic development built complex divisions of labor among economies
with very different technical and economic capabilities at very different stages of development.
Asian production activities aimed at American and European markets became increasingly
complex as Japan was joined by the subsequent tiers of producers.
These complex production networks have emerged most clearly in Asia, but they are used by
American and some European firms. Consequently, they are of competitive significance to all.  As
important, they are not confined to Asia. They are being replicated in North America; if Europeans
do not organize them in Europe, they are likely to be put in place by Asian and American
producers to serve their own strategies. Below, we tell the Asian story in some detail to give a
sense of reality to what would otherwise be an abstract analysis. For Danish producers, the
important points are that these networks now exist, that they are easily accessed, and that
production service intermediaries have emerged who will provide key-in-hand manufacturing
networks (i.e., create and manage the entire manufacturing CNPN) for the company that defines
a particular product.
Asia’s Development and the Emergence of CNPNs
Post war development and politics have driven Europe toward regional homogeneity. Or at least
that was the story until Western Europe abruptly regained its past. That European past consists
of a set of countries that are dramatically less developed than the core of Europe and which must
now reorient and restructure their production. By contrast, Asian development occurred in a series
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of tiers that created heterogeneity. Enduring political rivalry has entrenched and preserved it. In
brief outline, four developmental tiers have emerged in Asia: 
Tier One, "Early Late-Industrialization", is the case of Japan and its 19th
century industrialization. Modern Japanese politics is a story of the political
creation, in relative international isolation, of a market system intended to
assure continued political autonomy.  22
Tier Two, "Cold War Late-Industrialization"
 consists of Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea—the original newly industrializing Tigers
who jumped to the advanced industrial frontier using strategies of export-led
growth. 
Tier Three: "Late Late-Industrialization via CNPNs” includes the major
Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and
the coastal provinces of mainland China, along with potential newcomers like
Vietnam and Myanmar. The defining characteristic here is the central role of
cross-national production networks. These countries do not have the local
domestic manufacturing that developed indigenously in Japan and was created
through successful learning in the second tier countries.  The lack of indigenous
manufacturing experience rendered Southeast Asian countries more dependent
on MNCs for their industrial development.  Increasingly, their development23
strategies revolve around insertion into the cross-national division of labor
defined by partially overlapping or competing cross-border networks under the
control of Japanese, US, Korean, European, Taiwanese and other overseas
Chinese multinational corporations.24
Tier Four, "Large-scale Late-Developers.
 It is likely that India and especially
China, the enormous, populous late-developers, will be able to follow largely
indigenous strategies rather than the export-led and network-led development
of Tiers two and three. Their entry will dramatically alter the region’s
24
On the impacts of China’s Scale, see Stephen Cohen, Brandeis conference paper, 1996. On China’s impact on25
FDI in the region see Dennis Encarnation, forthcoming, 1997.
This discussion is drawn from the work of and discussions with Tim Sturgeon, a Research Associate at BRIE26
completing his dissertation in Geography. Tim Sturgeon, “The Rise of the Global Locality: Turnkey Production
Networks in Electronics Manufacturing” (University of California at Berkeley, 1996).
competitive dynamic—as China already has in drawing foreign direct investment
away from third Tier developers.25
In sum, four Tiers of development in this region riven by political and military rivalry have created
a heterogeneous production environment. In turn, Asia’s highly articulated regional production
networks emerged over time from this heterogeneous production environment  in several steps.
To stylize slightly:  26
• Outward processing, Branch Plant Production. In this first phase, firms
established two types of production. With outward processing, firms established
production units or contracted with production units for narrowly defined
activities that required extensive low cost labor. Branch plants were established
to jump walls of protection to gain access to local markets. 
• Contract Factories and OEM Manufacture. Firms were created by local or
regional entrepreneurs to perform a range of tasks and produce a range of
components or sub-systems defined by MNC final product producers. These
firms are continuously striving to extend the range of production and to
integrate forward and backward from specific assigned points in the production
chain.
• Cross-National Production Networks: These networks involve the
reweaving of the varied individual activities into entire production systems that
exploit local specializations throughout the region. Those networks were
initially organized by MNCs. 
• Turnkey Production Network Services: Production network intermediaries
such as Solectron arise who can manage the entire manufacturing network for
a customer by providing turnkey production networks.
While these network forms evolved sequentially, it is awkward to refer to them as stages.
Empirically, they overlap in time, in particular countries and in the experience of particular MNCs
that are initially at the core of the process. While each step required MNC, indigenous firm and
host country capacities that were created at least in part in the prior step, the emergence of the
25
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more elaborate arrangements did not replace the earlier ones. Rather, the several forms co-exist,
representing possibilities for different corporate production strategies.27
Such arrangements were, of course, used prior to their adoption in the electronics industry. For
quite some time, in industries like garments, footwear, furniture, and toys, it has been established
practice for "brand name" companies to depend on CNPNs for essentially all of their
manufacturing requirements. For example, US brand name apparel and footwear companies have
been utilizing a disaggregated industry structure to create non-equity-based production networks
on a world scale since the 1970s.  By contrast, disaggregation and production outsourcing did28
not begin in earnest in the electronics industry until the mid-1980s, a trend that has increased
dramatically as the 1990s have progressed. The emergence of contract production and cross-
national arrangements in consumer durable sectors such as electronics and now, perhaps,
automobiles as well, turns the phenomenon from one of marginal interest to one of real
significance. Instead of being confined to essentially labor-intensive low or middle skill products
in mature sectors, CNPNs now touch the core elements of the industrial economy and the most
rapidly expanding sectors.
The new production model is increasingly pervasive in electronics. Its scale and pace of
development is suggested by the rapid growth of the most visible manufacturing network service
companies. They have grown over the last decade from a marginal to significant industry segment
accounting for over $40 billion in sales in 1995.  The top ten firms grew last year by over 56%29
to almost US$10 Billion. Some estimates suggest that such firms now represent 10-20% of total
product-level electronics manufacturing, (up from less than 5% in 1982) and 40-50% of highly
volatile electronics industry segments, such as PCs and modems. Firms that provide global scale
manufacturing services, such as SCI Systems and Solectron, now produce on the scale of the
MNCs themselves and are growing extraordinarily quickly, in part by purchasing customers'
formerly captive (i.e., vertically integrated) facilities. For example, in 1986 Solectron generated
$60M in revenues and had all of its production capacity in Silicon Valley. By 1995, the company
had grown to more than $2B in revenues and had plants in North Carolina, Washington State,
Texas, Malaysia, Scotland, France, and Germany. Conversely, former vertically integrated
assemblers like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Apple have disposed of captive production facilities
and moved to the new CNPN model. By 1994, 50% of HP's 20 million circuit boards and 11%
of its 4.5 million final products were being assembled by contract manufacturers, as was fully 50%
26
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Sturgeon, “The Rise of the Global Locality.” There are, of course, a range of questions we have not addressed31
above. These questions include: How do core firms maintain control over their CNPNs and, conversely, under
what circumstances will network outsourcing undermine the capacity of the core firm to control the destiny of
its own products? Under what circumstances is internal production still necessary?
of Apple’s production. . And some of the newest and most successful systems companies own30
no
 internal manufacturing at all. Examples include: Dell (PCs), Silicon Graphics (workstations),
Cisco Systems (networking), Diebold (automatic teller machines), Digital Microwave
(communications), Telebit (modems), LAM Research (equipment), and Octel (communications).
In all of these cases, the move to CNPNs and contract production services permits system firms
to concentrate on Wintelist product definition and market strategies while conserving capital and
gaining production flexibility. The implications are that while Wintelism creates a whole range of
market opportunities in sectors that were previously dominated by giant assemblers playing in
controlled oligopolistic markets, the new CNPN possibilities provide small producers with a cost-
effective production strategy to exploit the new market opportunities. In short, as Tim Sturgeon
concludes, to the extent that network production structures have emerged in a wide range of
localities, are highly capable, and have developed an open, "merchant" character, an infrastructure
for the implementation of global production strategies without FDI has been put in place.  31
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The story of how the US firms built their CNPNs and constructed the alternative Asian supply base is told in33
detail by Borrus in Left for Dead.
III. How Wintelism and CNPNs altered competition in electronics
Wintelism and CNPNs have mattered mightily to the outcomes of competition in the electronics
industry.  They were the principal means by which the US electronics industry recovered from32
its mid-1980s nadir in competition with Japanese firms to reemerge as the global technical and
market leader by the mid-1990s. In the mid-1980s, Japanese firms dominated consumer electronics
and semiconductor memory, materials and equipment, and looked entirely capable of repeating
the feat in computers, office systems (e.g., copiers, faxes), and customer telecommunications
equipment. There was the danger, widely debated in the industry, that US producers of the latter
systems would become dependent, as had their consumer counterparts, on their competitors in
Japan for supply of the underlying technologies, processes and manufacturing capabilities that
went into their products. The danger was that such competitive dependence would be, as it was
in consumer electronics, a first step toward market exit.
That did not happen, however. As described earlier, Wintelism shifted the industry’s product-
market strategies away from final assembly and toward the distinctive value-added products
backed by standards strategies in which American innovations and entrepreneurial companies were
strong. Simultaneously, the American CNPNs created an alternative supply base in Asia—an
alternative to reliance on Japanese competitors for underlying component technologies and
manufacturing capabilities.  Simultaneously, the networks helped to lower production costs and33
turnaround times while keeping pace with rapid technological progress. In the bargain, the
networks spawned Asian-based direct competitors to Japanese firms in several of their stronghold
markets (e.g., memory chips, consumer electronics, and displays). In effect, taken together,
Wintelism and CNPNs enabled US firms to pioneer a new form of competition in electronics: one
that grew out of the distinctively American market environment and was adapted to overseas
opportunities. It is, as we have stressed above, a form of competition in which ‘core assets’ are
the intellectual property and know-how associated with setting, maintaining and continuously
evolving a de-facto market standard, a process that requires perpetual improvements in product
features, functionality, performance, costs and quality. And the core managerial skill is
orchestrating the CNPN, that is, managing the continuously changing sets of external relationships
and melding them with the relatively more stable core of internal activities in order to access
relevant technologies, design, develop, and manufacture the products, and get them from product
concept to order fulfillment in minimal time. 
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Production of Telecommunications Systems in the Wintelist Era: Cisco
System’s CNPN
by Michael Borrus
Consider a firm like Cisco Systems, the world’s leading supplier of routers, switches, and hubs for
corporate communications networks and the Internet. Compare it with the network equipment
business of the pre-divestiture AT&T and its international counterpart, ITT. Pre-Wintelism and
CNPN, everything from the R&D at central corporate laboratories to product design, engineering,
manufacturing, distribution and service was done by one AT&T/ITT affiliate or another, usually
located somewhere in the US for AT&T or Europe for ITT. The vast bulk of the underlying
technologies, components, parts, software and subsystems were produced internally by the two
companies. The finished product was “sold” directly to local phone companies. Control was
hierarchical and centralized in the US AT&T was the epitome of the hierarchically managed,
vertically integrated, multidivisional corporation. ITT was the epitome of the modern
corporation’s multinational extension to other markets.
By contrast, much of Cisco’s R&D is done at its corporate headquarters in Silicon Valley, but a
portion is also done through technology development alliances with key suppliers such as chip
companies and software vendors. Associated engineering is done in Cisco affiliates in Japan and
California, but sometimes also by lead vendors. The products are assembled in California and
Japan, from components and manufacturing services (e.g., board-stuffing, PCB design) that flow
from a variety of independent suppliers throughout Asia (including Taiwan, Korea, Japan,
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia) and the US and sometimes Europe. These suppliers are bound
to Cisco through a variety of non-equity contractual arrangements. Cisco’s Japanese “subsidiary”,
however, which is responsible for customizing the products for the Japanese market, is “owned”
by Cisco and 14 major Japanese electronics companies (each with an equity stake), that together
form a formidable coalition aimed at making Cisco’s “owned” but open protocols the standard for
corporate communications in Japan.
Several independent companies in California, Asia and Europe (including most of its Japanese
partners) produce to Cisco’s standard, adding value in the form of products or services that
interface in some fashion with Cisco’s products—and without which Cisco’s products would not
be complete because they could not fully perform core functions (a significant difference from the
more traditional model of behavior in which a firm might sell into the Bell System in competition
with Western Electric, but the customer did not need the outsider product to have a complete
system). The final product is sold directly to customers but also through a variety of third-party
channels including value-added resellers and systems integrators. After-sales service is frequently
undertaken by third-party suppliers.
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As the example suggests, the new form of competition is no longer confined largely to equity
investments and outsourcing in the manufacturing stage of production. It now extends throughout
the value chain and to an increasing variety of non-equity, but not arms-length relations. Consider,
for example, Internet software producer Netscape Communications’ product development and
distribution relationships: Product development is done in conjunction with a variety of
independent development partners such as SUN, Macromedia, Real Audio, Xing Technologies
and many others who develop “plug-in” packages of software functionality (e.g., Javascript
applets, authoring tools, audio and video players) designed to work seamlessly with Netscape’s
browser-server products—and without which the product would not be fully functional. The
software is distributed directly to customers and through a variety of independent channels
including on-line service providers such as Compuserve and AOL, traditional carriers such as
Pacific Bell, specialized retailers such as EggHead Software, value-added resellers who provide
Web set-up services, and mass marketers such as Costco.
As the examples suggest, this new form of competition has left no part of the information
technology and electronics sector untouched: It holds true as much for Microsoft as for hardware
vendors such as Cisco, as much for large-scale systems builders such as HP as for integrators such
as Anderson Consulting—and as much for standard-followers such as Compaq as for standard-
holders such as Netscape. For these firms, in important ways, key attributes of the new network
form of production organization reflected unique characteristics of the domestic US environment.
Indeed, while most firms in the industry gravitated toward a network model in response to similar
global market conditions, those models differed by ownership and control: The distinctively
American model contrasts with equally distinctive production networks under the control of
Japanese, Taiwanese and other indigenous Asian capital—though for reasons explored before,
those alternative network models were competitively less effective than the American in the last
round of market rivalry.
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For example, Business Week’s famous issue on the “Virtual Corporation” is one such effort to diffuse similar35
ideas, although we think it misconstrues essential features described above.
IV. Are These Developments Confined to Electronics?
In our view, Wintelism and cross-national production networks are likely to be broad features of
the international economy that reach well beyond electronics. Electronics may be the originating
sector, the development test-bed, for the new approach to competition and production.  But the34
enormous possibilities for creating distinctive products and new product segments, and for
increasing the functionality of existing products, suggest that the new approaches will diffuse more
widely to other industries. The course of diffusion of the new organization and practice is
unpredictable, but there are clear channels through which it can flow.
First, as argued earlier, digital, microelectronics, is transforming products and processes in a wide
range of sectors.  Some, such as telecommunications have been converted from electromechanical
to electronic processes. In others, such as automobiles, electronics is capturing a substantial
portion of the product value-added. The more evident automobile entertainment packages are not
the significant part of the story. Rather, every major subsystem in the modern automobile from
brake, suspension and powertrain controls through keyless entry, seat memories and lighting
controls, and soon navigation systems, is increasingly premised on microelectronics. The
increasing value of electronic components means that cars will be built around electronic systems,
thus offering the customers more features at lower cost while reducing lead time and inventory.
Firms that effectively cope with the new technologies will be the winners. As a recent Economist
article concluded, few products will be immune from this revolution. As microelectronics pervades 
the consumer durable professional goods and capital equipment sectors, transforming their
products and processes, “Wintelism” and CNPNs will become increasingly viable strategic
alternatives—perhaps indispensable—in those sectors. 
Second, as argued earlier, “best practice” models of corporate organization and strategy tend to
spread well beyond the firms or sectors of their origin. Indeed, ideas about mass production
dominated thinking in many industrial and service companies even when, in retrospect, “Fordist”
notions were wildly inappropriate. Wintelism and CNPNs are similarly likely to be imitated and
to spread into models of best practice, to be taught and diffused widely.  In fact, we believe that35
as the ideas spread, they will be found applicable in sectors such as automobiles that were
organized on a centrally controlled vertical model in earlier periods. The Japanese auto sector, in
its hey-day in the 1980s, and Japan’s consumer durable sectors more broadly, suggest the
possibilities of assembler-controlled “virtual” vertical integration within a single country. The
possibilities of CNPNs in consumer durables will likely spread with the off shore investments of
the Japanese and Korean firms and now the emergence of third tier auto producers in Asia
explicitly organized on a network model. 
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As suggested earlier, fabric is produced, often in highly automated plants, in one place; cut and processed in37
another, and stitched and assembled and finished in still others. Many “assemblers” are simply product definition
and marketing companies who provide design, distribution, and above all, brand names like Nike. Why not call
this practice “Nikeism”? Textile/apparel innovation is basically limited and does not generally define the broader
texture of the industry as a whole. There is much less room for the constituent suppliers to capture market rents
and semi-monopoly positions.
Third, firms that might never have developed CNPN approaches to production can soon, if not
already, buy them in the market and concentrate their own efforts on Wintelist product
opportunities. Simultaneously, the manufacturing service firms capable of providing turnkey
networked production systems will certainly attempt to spread their message in order to expand
their business. And clear demonstration effects will be provided by the success of high profile early
adopters, perhaps especially traditionally large integrated companies like IBM that migrate to the
new models and newer Asian producers who succeed in Western markets like DaeWoo. Indeed,
the networks, and the Wintelist strategies that empower them, are likely to spread widely beyond
Asia as MNCs bring the new approaches to other markets. We believe, for example, that the new
approaches are likely to be an essential feature of the integrated European economy as the former
Eastern Europe returns to the Western marketplace.36
Finally, these practices have already proven that they can diffuse across sectors. As mentioned
earlier, they have already moved from precursor sectors like the textile/apparel complex into
electronics. There would appear to be few constraints on continued diffusion now that they touch
the core of modern industrial economies.37
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V. The Implications for Denmark
What are the implications for Danish firms and for Denmark of Cross National Production
Networks (CNPNs) and "Wintelism", developments which have altered the character of industrial
competition? We have, to be certain, only the outsider’s sketchy understanding of Danish industry.
Denmark, we were both taught, fed grain bought on the world market to cows and pigs and, in
the process, created modern dairy farming. Educational and technological institutions were
developed to support this emerging strategy, institutions which also provided an underpinning for
an industry consisting of small/medium sized niche market players competing on quality. A
distinctive pattern of trade and innovation rooted in small- and middle-sized companies and
supported by a distinctive national system of innovation resulted. If that characterization of Danish
industry is at all accurate, there ought to be significant leeway to adapt strategies and institutions
to the era of competition now emerging.
Wintelism and CNPNs together separate product development from production and radically
minimize the capital requirements and the range of in-house production skills needed for volume
production and mass market strategies. They also provide a merchant, open-market source for
many of the critical elements of systems, making them available for distinctive final product
development. These factors suggest three types of new business opportunities available to Danish
industry. Our comments are intended to provoke discussion and are not meant as a recipe. The
question is whether Danish firms and the Danish national system are suited to capturing these new
possibilities.
Niches, Prototypes, and Volume: The skill at developing sophisticated products for niche markets
opens the possibility of smaller companies with product development skills that can in fact aim at
larger volume markets. Thus, as in the fashion business, producers often have a limited, sometimes
almost custom, line for a very high-end market while developing volume business outlets at
different price points for different quality products. The high-end business, whether directly
profitable or not, often establishes the value of the general trademark for the broader market.
Hence we have Armani and AX. Another way of highlighting this opportunity is to ask whether
Bang and Olufsen could now pursue both a high-end line that establishes standards and a volume
business via contracting for the appropriate production network. Certainly Bang and Olufsen’s
distinguishing expertise in mechanical engineering as well as in consumer electronics has generated
very distinctive products that have permitted them to find defensible niches in an industry
traditionally characterized by volume production. Bang/Olufsen certainly must choose strategies
that will reinforce as well as build on the core capacities and thus will continue to permit
distinctive product development. It must avoid strategies that would undermine those capacities
without replacing them. Where lies the Bang/Olufsen position in the emerging world of networked
digital multi-media, cross national and often contract production organizations, and continuous
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profound component innovation? These questions are significant precisely because the new
production organizations and contract production systems open questions for all producers about
possible new product lines and market strategies, while the emerging component technologies are
altering not only the products themselves but changing the problem of managing technology
development. 
To return to our argument here, this first opportunity is for the niche market skills of product
development to be applied to volume markets through contract manufacturing. The niche market
product becomes the prototype of, or a parallel development for, volume market products.
Certainly, this is neither automatic nor easy; there are new difficulties and issues. Are niche
markets more insulated from the pace of new product introduction forced by technological
evolution and shifting fashions? If capital does not have to be committed in advance for volume
production, substantial obligations are still likely to follow if volume product introductions fail.
Nonetheless, a new opportunity would seem to be there.
Selling Turnkey Product Systems: Production is not the only barrier to the strategy outlined above.
The barrier of marketing and distribution may prove even more critical. Firms may find that
developing prototypes and even entire production networks to supply a product is possible, but
also discover that the tasks and risks associated with volume markets are still too great. In that
case, can a firm contract to deliver a product system that consists of more than a prototype, but
rather a production model and entire production system, to a volume distributor—be it Phillips
or Compaq or Samsung. Here the distinct deliverable is a completed product system, a production
model and key-in-hand production system. For many companies that control a distribution system,
filling that system with a product is the task. For firms like Samsung, distinctive upper-end quality
designs are seriously lacking. Clearly there is a market to go beyond the prototype to production
system.  
Contract Manufacturing and the European Management of Cross-National Production Networks:
Common to each of the first opportunities would be the ability to manage international production
networks. As noted earlier, companies providing just that “product” to the marketplace are
growing rapidly in North America and Asia. Precisely because the CNPNs are underdeveloped in
Europe, there is an opportunity to become a provider of such networks. 
Evidently, if a Danish final product company worked with an existing Danish firm, of whatever
sectoral provenance be it shipping company or trading company, to develop a provider of cross-
national production networks, that firm could provide such networks more widely in Europe.
Moreover, the likelihood that such networks can be built from almost entirely European sources
is very high. Zysman has argued elsewhere that cross-national production networks are in fact
35
Consider, for example, the story in the Danish press on January 28, as reported by DK Today, an on-line news38
service:
“DK IT WORLD LEADER”
“DK could well be the leading country as far as IT and Internet trade is concerned. According to a survey by
the Institute for Future Research DK is ahead of even USA with respect to the numbers of PCs in homes.
Three quarters of Danes under the age of 50-60 are now using computers, and practically all families with
young children own one or more computers. In fact most children now have pre-school computer knowledge.
And home shopping by the Internet could explode as soon as a reliable means of payment has been
introduced, because Danes are used to paying with the Dankort (credit card).”
emerging, thus linking East and West Europe and, in so doing, perhaps making Europe a more
competitive regional economy. So the supply of CNPNs is itself a business.
The production reorganization implicit in the production networks is likely to reinforce
employment opportunities in Denmark. It is not a matter of moving the same production to lower
wage locations, but rather of creating new product lines, expanding existing lines, and generating
new businesses. Jobs in product design, development, and the more skilled elements of production
are likely to expand in Denmark as they have in Japan. Note that the rise of the value of the yen
in the past years has encouraged a substantial movement of production out of Japan into the rest
of Asia. Nonetheless, Japanese trade with the region has remained in substantial surplus with the
export to the new production locations of high value-added components and production
equipment. The key for Denmark will be how effectively it develops advanced technology and how
effectively its national system of technology development can be applied to the market
opportunities made possible by "Wintelism" and cross national production networks. There is
every reason to be optimistic.38
The ideas outlined above are speculative possibilities proposed for discussion and not a list of
recipes ready to be cooked. Nonetheless, some version of the ideas outlined here may well be
necessary. However the developments described above play out, volume markets will be more
available to niche market players who already use the flexibility of production systems and the
strength of their distribution system to address niche markets that have hitherto been protected
by their discrete character. The only question is which firms will exploit these possibilities as they
emerge in Europe. Will Danish firms become expert at using the new strategies and players in the
provision of networked production services?
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Conclusion: The Risks and the Requirements
The opportunities sketched above all emphasize market knowledge, distinctive not imitative
product ideas, and a capacity to follow the evolutionary paths of critical technologies—all
characteristics that Danish industry has shown in abundance. But can small and middle-sized
Danish firms manage the particular market and technology disjuncture represented by the
transition to Wintelist strategies and CNPNs. Or put differently, does the Danish national
innovation system provide the context and support for this adaptation.  Danish development, first39
and still primarily rooted in an agro-industrial complex formed around a few large private food
processing companies and a system of farming cooperatives, would not seem to be a firm base for
this competitive style rooted in the electronics industry. Conversely, the emergent success in
networked electronics and software suggests the possibility that smaller Danish firms can compete
for dominant position in market segments and that the new electronics era may permit Danish
industry to break loose from the hold of its agro-industrial past. In any case, it is evident that the
capacity within the firm to follow market developments and technological evolutions may have
to be reinforced. But, that need not be a task exclusively for firms. There are undoubtedly public
policies or joint industry actions that can facilitate these efforts of market and technological
monitoring. Public policy support for joint institutions to permit and facilitate close monitoring of
markets and technology is certainly in the tradition of the Danish innovation system and may be
part of the solution. 
A second issue is whether international markets can adequately substitute for a comprehensive
local and regional technology supply base. Borrus has argued that the supply base is the local
capability to provide
“parts, components, subsystems, materials and equipment technologies available
for new products and process development, as well as the structure of relations
among the firms that supply and use these elements. The supply base shapes the
possibilities confronting users by enabling or deterring access to appropriate
technologies in a timely fashion at a reasonable price.”40
The components and subsystems may be available in international markets, but is early warning
of them adequate? Is the subtle knowledge of how to apply and develop them sufficient? There
is no automatic answer. We note, however, that in many cases, so long as the international supply
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base retains an open, merchant character, the dispositive skill is applications knowledge. For
example, the Danish firm Oticon solved the problem of applying digital signal processing to the
hearing aid from Denmark with components developed in Silicon Valley.
Also critical will be continued support by policy to the emergence of the leading-edge user-
markets that are often the driver of an entire wave of technological advance. For example, the
success of Nokia and Ericsson in Cellular telephony is directly linked to the policy of creating
cellular usage in the Nordic countries. Could this conjunction of rich, educated populations and
directed public policy be used self-consciously to create leading edge markets in other Nordic
industries? In short, on the role of public policy, as much as in firm strategy and organization,
turns the potential for Danish industry to seize the coming era of Wintelism and CNPNs for its
own competitive advantage.
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